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THE LOGICAL BURDENS OF PROOF
Assertion and hypothesis
Abstract. The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) jus-
tiﬁcation. In a ﬁrst, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent
from justiﬁcation and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic
and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second,
antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justiﬁcation
and results in two logical systems of information and justiﬁcation: AR4 and
AR4, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter
proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a wide variety
of epistemic norms. After comparing the diﬀerent norms of justiﬁcation
involved in these logical systems, two hexagons expressing Aristotelian re-
lations of opposition will be gathered in order to clarify how (a fragment
of) pragmatic formulas can be interpreted in a fuzzy-based question-answer
semantics.
Keywords: logic for pragmatics; assertion; hypothesis; question-answer se-
mantics; logical opposition
1. Introduction
Justifying an empirical hypothesis is considered to be a key issue in
science. In fact, some standards of justiﬁcation are usually required, in
order to accept or reject a hypothesis. In this classical picture, there
is a clear distinction between the truth-conditions of the content of a
hypothesis and the epistemic acceptance of the hypothesis. And it is
following this framework that a pragmatic logic LP for assertions and
hypotheses will be presented. Such a pragmatic system is intended to
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serve as a possible logical basis behind the formal representation of the
standards of justiﬁcation of hypotheses. Interestingly, however, in a
multi-agent epistemic context agents may hold diﬀerent standards for
the justiﬁcation and acceptance of hypotheses. We argue, therefore,
that an agent-based view on the justiﬁcation and acceptance conditions
for hypotheses can be easily associated with an antirealist epistemology.
Two logical systems endowed with a question-answer semantics, AR4 and
AR4, will be introduced in order to formalize these antirealist aspects of
hypothesis acceptance in the context of agents with diﬀerent standards
of proof and justiﬁcation. The following sections will expose a thorough
analysis of the pros and cons of the realistic and antirealist epistemologies
behind the proposed logical systems. Section 2 explores the pragmatic
logic of assertion. In Section 3, the language of the pragmatic logic for
hypotheses is presented. Section 4 provides an outline of AR4 and AR4
and the antirealist epistemology on which they are based. Section 5
compares these systems with LP, focusing on their opposition relations.
Finally, concluding remarks are discussed in Section 6.
2. Logic for pragmatics: assertions
This section is devoted to introduce a pragmatic logic for assertion (LP)
originally developed by Dalla Pozza and Garola [7].1 The main feature
of this logical system is the possibility to distinguish the propositional
content of assertions expressed by radical formulas and sentential for-
mulas expressed by asserted propositions such as ⊢ γ, in which “⊢” is
the sign for assertion. The former formulas are propositions, while the
latter formulas are thus obtained by applying the Fregean assertion sign
in front of radical formulas. Coherently with what noticed by Frege,
(i) there can be no nested occurrences of the assertion sign and (ii)
truth-functional connectives cannot be applied to formulas expressing
judgments of assertions. For this reason pragmatic connectives, which
are not truth-conditional, are introduced in order to formulate complex
sentential formulas expressing assertions. As we will show, such prag-
matic connectives have an intuitionistic-like behaviour.
The pragmatic language LP is the union of the set of radical formulae
RAD and the set of sentential formulas SENT, which can be deﬁned
recursively:
1 Some applications of LP to philosophical problems are provided in [4, 5, 6].
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RAD γ ::= p|¬γ|γ1 ∧ γ2|γ1 ∨ γ2|γ1 → γ2|γ1 ↔ γ2|
SENT i) Elementary sentential formulas θ ::=⊢ γ
ii) Sentential δ ::= θ| ∼ δ|δ1 ∩ δ2|δ1 ∪ δ2|δ1 ⊃ δ2|δ1 ≡ δ2|.
In particular, a pragmatic language LP is composed of two categories of
logical-pragmatic signs:
• the signs of pragmatic illocutionary force (“⊢” assertion);
• the pragmatic connectives: ∼ pragmatic negation, ∩ pragmatic con-
junction, ∪ pragmatic disjunction, ⊃ pragmatic implication, ≡ prag-
matic equivalence.
Every radical formula of LP has a truth value (true or false) and every
sentential formula has a justiﬁcation value (‘J ’ justiﬁed or ‘U ’ unjusti-
ﬁed) that is deﬁned in terms of the intuitive notion of proof and depends
on the truth value of its radical sub-formulas. The semantics of LP is
the same as for classical logic, and it provides only the interpretation of
the radical formulas, by assigning them a truth-value and interpreting
propositional connectives as truth functions in the standard way. The
semantic rules for radical formulas are the usual classical Tarskian ones
and specify the truth-conditions (only for radical formulas) through an
assignment function σ, thus regulating the semantic interpretation of LP.
Let γ1, γ2 be radical formulas and 1 = true and 0 = false; then:
1. σ(¬γ1) = 1 iﬀ σ(γ1) = 0
2. σ(γ1 ∧ γ2) = 1 iﬀ σ(γ1) = 1 and σ(γ2) = 1
3. σ(γ1 ∨ γ2) = 1 iﬀ σ(γ1) = 1 or σ(γ2) = 1
4. σ(γ1 → γ2) = 1 iﬀ σ(γ1) = 0 or σ(γ2) = 1
5. σ(γ1 ↔ γ2) = 1 iﬀ σ(γ1) = σ(γ2).
Pragmatic connectives have a meaning which is explicated by the BHK
(Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov) intended interpretation of intuitionistic
logical constants. The illocutionary force of assertion plays an essential
role in determining the pragmatic component of the meaning of an ele-
mentary expression, together with the semantic component expressed in
the radical formulas.
Justiﬁcation rules regulate the pragmatic evaluation π, specifying
the justiﬁcation conditions for the assertive formulas in function of the
σ-assignments of truth-values for their radical sub-formulas:
JR1 – Let γ be a radical formula. π(⊢ γ) = J iﬀ a proof exists that γ is
true, i.e. that σ assigns to γ the value 1. π(⊢ γ) = U iﬀ no proof
exists that γ is true.
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JR2 – Let δ be an assertive formula. Then, π(∼ δ) = J iﬀ a proof exists
that δ is unjustiﬁed. i.e., that π(δ) = U .
JR3 – Let δ1 and δ2 be assertive formulas. Then:
1. π(δ1 ∩ δ2) = J iﬀ π(δ1) = J and π(δ2) = J ;
2. π(δ1 ∪ δ2) = J iﬀ π(δ1) = J or π(δ2) = J ;
3. π(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J iﬀ a proof exists that π(δ2) = J whenever
π(δ1) = J ;
4. π(δ1 ≡ δ2) = J iﬀ π(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J and π(δ2 ⊃ δ1) = J .
The Soundness criterion (SC ) is the following:
Let be γ ∈ RAD, then π(⊢ γ) = J implies that σ(γ) = 1.
SC states that if an assertion is justiﬁed, then the content of assertion
is true.
Definition 1. A formula δ is pragmatically valid iﬀ for every Tarskian
semantic interpretation σ and for every pragmatic function of justiﬁca-
tion π, the formula δ = J .
An intuitionistic fragment is obtained by limiting the language of
LP to complex formulas that are valid with atomic radicals. This is
an intuitionistic fragment ILP, while the classical fragment corresponds
to the fragment of sentential formulas without pragmatic connectives
[7]. It is worth noting that the justiﬁcation rules do not always allow
determining the justiﬁcation value of a complex sentential formula when
all the justiﬁcation values of its components are known. For instance,
NR1 π(δ) = J implies π(∼ δ) = U ,
NR2 π(δ) = U does not imply π(∼ δ) = J ,
NR3 π(∼ δ) = J implies π(δ) = U ,
NR4 π(∼ δ) = U does not imply π(δ) = J .
There exists a function ( )∗ from assertive formulas to the corresponding
modal ones in the modal system S4, where 2γ means that there is an
(intuitive) proof (conclusive evidence) for γ:
(⊢ γ)∗ 2γ
(∼ δ)∗ 2¬(δ)∗
(δ1 ∩ δ2)
∗ (δ1)
∗ ∧ (δ2)
∗
(δ1 ∪ δ2)
∗ (δ1)
∗ ∨ (δ2)
∗
(δ1 ⊃ δ2)
∗
2((δ1)
∗ → (δ2)
∗)
(δ1 ≡ δ2)
∗
2((δ1)
∗ ↔ (δ2)
∗)
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Connectives for radical and sentential formulas are related in the follow-
ing way:
(a) (⊢ ¬γ) ⊃ (∼⊢ γ)
(b) ((⊢ γ1) ∩ (⊢ γ2)) ≡ (⊢ (γ1 ∧ γ2))
(c) ((⊢ γ1) ∪ (⊢ γ2)) ⊃ (⊢ (γ1 ∨ γ2))
(d) (⊢ (γ1 → γ2)) ⊃ (⊢ γ1 ⊃⊢ γ2)
(e) (⊢ (γ1 ↔ γ2)) ⊃ (⊢ γ1 ≡⊢ γ2)
Bridge principles (a)–(e) show the formal relations between pragmatic
connectives and connectives in the radicals. Formula (a) expresses that
from the assertion of not-γ the non-assertability of γ can be inferred.
(b) states that the conjunction of two assertions is equivalent to the
assertion of a conjunction; (c) indicates that from the disjunction of
two assertions one can infer the assertion of a disjunction. Formula (d)
states the idea that from the assertion of a classical material implication
follows the pragmatic implication between two assertions. Finally, (e)
states that from the assertion of a biconditional follows the equivalence
of assertions.
3. Logic for pragmatics: hypotheses
In this section, we consider hypotheses as a primitive illocutionary force,
indicated by H, which is justiﬁed by means of a scintilla of evidence [4].
What counts as evidence is contextually speciﬁed. The language of this
hypothetical logic for pragmatics (HLP) is the union of RAD and the set
of hypothetical formulas HF .
RAD γ ::= p|¬γ|γ1 ∧ γ2|γ1 ∨ γ2|γ1 → γ2|γ1 ↔ γ2|
HF (i) elementary hypothetical formulas: η ::= Hγ
(ii) hypothetical formulas:
κ ::= η|⌢ κ|κ1 ∩ κ2|κ1 ∪ κ2|κ1 = κ2|κ1 ≡ κ2|
As in the case of assertions, there are connectives in the radical formulas.
Moreover there are hypothetical connectives (which show a certain type
of duality with respect to the ones connecting assertions) for hypothetical
formulas which formally behave in accordance with the following justiﬁ-
cation rules. Observe that ε is a function of evidence from hypothetical
formulas to justiﬁcation values.
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HJR1 Let γ be a radical formula. ε(Hγ) = J iﬀ there is a scintilla
of evidence that γ is true, while ε(Hγ) = U iﬀ no scintilla of
evidence exists that γ is true.
HJR2 Let κ be a hypothetical formula. Then, ε(⌢ κ) = J iﬀ the
evidence that ε(κ) = J is smaller than the evidence that ε(⌢
κ) = U (that is, iﬀ we are more justiﬁed in doubting about k
rather than in believing it).
HJR3 Let κ1 and κ2 be hypothetical formulas. Then:
(i) ε(κ1 ∩ κ2) = J iﬀ both ε(κ1) = J and ε(κ2) = J ;
(ii) ε(κ1 ∪ κ2) = J iﬀ either ε(κ1) = J or ε(κ2) = J ;
(iii) ε(κ1 = κ2) = J iﬀ there is evidence that κ2 is justiﬁed
whenever there is evidence that κ1is justiﬁed.
(iv) ε(δ1 ≡ δ2) = J iﬀ ε(k1 = k2) = J and ε(k2 = k1) = J .
The soundness criterion for hypotheses is the following one:
Let be γ ∈ RAD, then ε(Hγ) = J implies that there is a scintilla
of evidence that σ(γ) = 1.
Let us consider now some notable principles regarding hypothetical nega-
tion:
HNR1 ε(κ) = J does not imply that ε(⌢ κ) = U ,
HNR2 ε(κ) = U implies that ε(⌢ κ) = J ,
HNR3 ε(⌢ κ) = J implies that ε(κ) = U ,
HNR4 ε(⌢ κ) = U implies that ε(κ) = J .
A fuzzy interpretation of the content of hypotheses seems to be quite
natural in order to easily handle our pre-theoretical insights concerning
them, especially when there exists severe uncertainty2. Radical formulas
can be also intuitively interpreted in a fuzzy logic, namely a logic whose
truth-values, indicated by | |, range in degree between 0 and 1, in the
following way:
|¬γ| = 1− |γ|
|γ1 ∨ γ2| = max(|γ1|, |γ2|)
|γ1 ∧ γ2| = min(|γ1|, |γ2|)
|γ1 → γ2| =
{
1 if |γ1| ≤ |γ2|
1− (|γ1| − |γ2|) if |γ1| > |γ2|
2 This might be particularly welcome when we want to deal with notions like the
plausibility of hypotheses. Unlike probability, plausibility measures are, for instance,
not required to be additive.
The logical burdens of proof 515
|γ1 ↔ γ2| =
{
1 if |γ1| = |γ2|
1− (|γ1| − |γ2|) if |γ1| 6= |γ2|
The following interpretation3 shows how hypothetical formulas are in-
terpreted in this fuzzy framework.
Hγ1 = J |γ1| 6= 0
Hγ1 = U |γ1| = 0
⌢ Hγ1 = J 1− |γ1| > |γ1|
⌢ Hγ1 = U |γ1| ≥1− |γ1|
(Hγ1 = Hγ2) = J |γ1| ≤ |γ2|
(Hγ1 = Hγ2) = U |γ1| > |γ2|
(Hγ1 ∩Hγ2) = J |γ1| 6= 0 and |γ2| 6= 0
(Hγ1 ∩Hγ2) = U |γ1| = 0 or |γ2| = 0
(Hγ1 ∪Hγ2) = J |γ1| 6= 0 or |γ2| 6= 0
(Hγ1 ∪Hγ2) = U |γ1| = 0 and |γ2| = 0
(Hγ1 ≡ Hγ2) = J |γ1| =|γ2|
(Hγ1 ≡ Hγ2) = U |γ1| 6=|γ2|
Definition 2 (Pragmatic validity for hypothetical formulas). A formula
k is pragmatically valid iﬀ for every | · | and ε, k is justiﬁed.
The modal translation in S4 of hypothetical formulas is the following,
( )∗∗ being a function from hypothetical formulas to the corresponding
modal ones:4
(Hγ)∗∗ ♦γ
(⌢ κ)∗∗ ♦¬(κ)∗∗
(κ1 ∩ κ2)
∗∗ (κ1)
∗∗ ∧ (κ2)
∗∗
(κ1 ∪ κ2)
∗∗ (κ1)
∗∗ ∨ (κ2)
∗∗
(κ1 = κ2)
∗∗ ((κ1)
∗∗ → (κ2)
∗∗)
(κ1 ≡ κ2)
∗∗ ((κ1)
∗∗ ↔ (κ2)
∗∗)
Hypothetical bridge principles between connectives for radical and hy-
pothetical formulas are the following:
(a′) (⌢ Hγ) = (H¬γ)
(b′) H(γ1 ∧ γ2) = (H(γ1) ∩H(γ2))
(c′) H(γ1 ∨ γ2) = (H(γ1) ∪H(γ2))
3 Hereafter, when not necessary the indication of the justiﬁcation function will
be omitted.
4 Similar modal translations have been recently analyzed by Shramko [12, 13].
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(d′) (Hγ1 = Hγ2) = H(γ1 → γ2)
(e′) (Hγ1 ≡ Hγ2)= H(γ1 ↔ γ2)
General principles connecting assertions and hypotheses are the fol-
lowing:
(GP1): ⊢ ¬γ = J iﬀ Hγ = U
and
(GP2): From the justiﬁcation of ⊢ γ follows the justiﬁcation of Hγ.
(GP1) states that a propositional content cannot be part of a justiﬁed
hypothesis when the assertion of its negation is justiﬁed. (GP2) indicates
that the ground justifying an assertion of γ is suﬃcient to justify the
hypothesis of γ. In fuzzy terms, this means that if the |γ| = 1, then it is
certainly diﬀerent from 0.
4. Justification and truth
In LP there are two main justiﬁcation conditions that may be inter-
preted as burdens of proof, based on the diﬀerent levels of justiﬁcation
for the illocutionary acts of assertion and hypothesis. However, truth-
conditions and justiﬁcation conditions are clearly diﬀerentiated, assum-
ing a semantic realist perspective on the nature of truth. On the other
hand, the holders of an antirealist epistemology may avoid accepting a
transcendent notion of truth whilst favouring a notion of truth that is
epistemically constrained. As we will see, this diﬀerent view on truth
may enrich the family of epistemic burdens of proof. At the same time,
an epistemically constrained notion of truth might rule out some usual
distinctions: between the purely semantic notions of truth and meaning,
on the one hand; and, on the other hand, between the epistemic notions
of knowledge and justiﬁcation.
4.1. Modes and modalities
Assertions and hypotheses are two modes of judgment with distinctive
commitments. Therefore, the next transition into modal logic may seem
anything but consequential. LP relies upon an analogy with modalities.
Following the previous translations, assertion corresponds to the strong
modality  whereas hypothesis corresponds to the weak modality ♦,
all of which nicely match with the interpretations assigned to assertions
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and hypotheses in LP. Indeed, it has been said that an assertion ⊢ γ
is justiﬁed iﬀ there is a conclusive evidence for the truth of γ; and a
hypothesis Hγ is justiﬁed iﬀ there is a scintilla of evidence for the truth
of γ. Another obvious comparison with quantiﬁers is feasible, in the sense
that any justiﬁed assertion is made with sentences that are true in every
case, whilst any justiﬁed hypothesis is made with sentences that are true
in at least one case. However, can anything be said about the burdens
of proof associated with the concepts of assertion and hypothesis?
Roughly speaking, the diﬀerence between two ways of thinking about
epistemic attitudes corresponds to a diﬀerence between two ways of han-
dling with philosophical logic, namely: in a modal, or many-valued way.
LP coheres with a modal approach towards epistemic attitudes; at the
same time, the following logical system supports a many-valued view of
evidence including various criteria of justiﬁcation. However, it is worth
mentioning that not every illocutionary act expresses a given degree of
force or can be formalized within a modal framework. To shed some light
on this pluralist view, we will delve into two levels of discourse in formal
epistemology; such a result can be achieved by adopting an antirealist
perspective on truth and evidence.
4.2. Some issues about truth
It is taken for granted that any epistemic agent ought to believe what is
true. As a matter of fact, the crucial problem lies in the way to warrant
the access of these agents to truth, but the classical and tripartite Pla-
tonic deﬁnition of knowledge does not speciﬁcally address this issue. As
we have seen, realists and anti-realists have diﬀerent views on the role of
truth and the way in which it may be acknowledged. More speciﬁcally,
a clear distinction between an ontic and an epistemic level on truth may
contribute to elucidating the dispute.
Starting from an ontic level of discourse (see Section 4.4), agents
accept or not the occurrence of given “facts” on the basis of accepted
or rejected evidence. In the light of this, we also present an epistemic
deﬁnition of truth-values related to the occurrence of evidence (see Sec-
tion 4.6).
Definition 3 (Truth and falsity). A given sentence γ is:
• (anti-realistically) true iﬀ there is an evidence for γ;
• (anti-realistically) false iﬀ there is an evidence against γ.
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A standard objection to this deﬁnition is that the latter gives a too
weak view of truth-values: the occurrence of evidence for or against a
sentence is clearly not a suﬃcient condition for its truth or falsity, re-
spectively. After all, some evidence may be misleading and contrary to
others. A possible antirealist reply to this objection is that it assumes a
realist perspective of truth-ascription: no agent can have a direct access
to truth without making use of intermediate evidence; correspondingly,
any truth-ascription is to be made in the light of evidence made avail-
able to agents. In other words, the trouble consists in ﬁnding the right
justiﬁcation among a great amount of defeasible evidence. In this re-
spect, the burden of proof depicted by LP is an idealization of what any
given evidence is supposed to aﬀord in epistemology: to what extent can
evidence be “conclusive” in any epistemic context of discourse, and how
can the epistemic force of any given evidence facing with opposite data
be outweighed? Are there no diﬀerent strengths of evidence for diﬀerent
agents, thereby requiring a more detailed picture of what a burden of
proof may mean? Indeed, the mainstream opposition between classical
and intuitionist logicians can be viewed as a typical case of disagreement
between two diﬀerent requirements for truth-ascription. Hereafter, we
want to show that such a disagreement may be exempliﬁed in many more
ways. But it should be kept in mind that the shift towards an antirealist
notion of truth has a price to pay, since justiﬁcation and semantic con-
ditions wind up being indistinguishable; and for instance, undecidable
sentences would turn out to be meaningless even when they seem to ex-
press a cognitive meaning. However, in a strongly antirealist framework
there is a pluralist view on the norms of acceptability of evidence, which
is based on diﬀerent criteria and norms of justiﬁcation.
4.3. Question-answer semantics
To give a more comprehensive, pluralist and antirealist formalization of
the burdens of proof, let us ﬁrst consider a logic of information AR4. It
is based on a dialogical formal semantics; that is to say, question-answer
semantics, where the logical value of a sentence is a set of ordered answers
to previous ordered questions. Questions are about the semantic value
of sentences, and they match with a bilateralist theory of judgment that
departs from Frege’s theory of judgment.
Definition 4 (Questions). Questions about γ are formalized by a dyadic
function Q(γ) = 〈q1(γ), q2(γ)〉 such that
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• q1(γ): ‘Is γ (anti-realistically) true?’, i.e., ‘Is there evidence for γ?’
• q2(γ): ‘Is γ (anti-realistically) false?’ i.e., ‘Is there evidence against γ?’
Definition 5 (Answers). Answers to questions about γ are combina-
tions of yes- and no-answers A(γ) = 〈a1(γ),a2(γ)〉. Let 1 and 0 be
symbols for ‘yes’ and ‘no’, respectively. Then:
• A(γ) = 〈1, 1〉 means that there is evidence for γ and evidence against
γ,
• A(γ) = 〈1, 0〉 means that there is evidence for γ and no evidence
against γ,
• A(γ) = 〈0, 1〉 means that there is no evidence for γ and evidence
against γ,
• A(γ) = 〈0, 0〉 means that there is no evidence for γ and no evidence
against γ.
4.4. A logic of information AR4
The system AR4 is a formalization of what agents may accept or reject,
according to ontic norms of truth-preservation that hold for any agent.
We take this norm to be a primary burden of truth, assuming that the
latter cannot be attained without a preliminary step of justiﬁcation.
AR4 = 〈L, fc,4〉 is composed of:
• a language L of atomic sentences: p, q, . . . , and complex sentences γ1,
γ2, . . . ,
• a set of logical constants fc = {¬,∧,∨,→}, i.e., functions mapping
on L,
• a set of four logical values 4 = {11,10,01,00}.
Each of the logical constants fc is characterized by a unique ontic norm
about its truth- and falsity-conditions, by means of maximal and mini-
mal answer-functions ⊓ and ⊔ upon their available data. Thus, for any
sentence γ interpreted ontically as A(γ) = 〈a1(γ),a2(γ)〉:
• negation: A(¬γ1) = 〈a2(γ1),a1(γ1)〉
• conjunction: A(γ1 ∧ γ2) = 〈a1(γ1) ⊓ a1(γ2),a2(γ1) ⊔ a2(γ2)〉
• disjunction: A(γ1 ∨ γ2) = 〈a1(γ1) ⊔ a1(γ2),a2(γ1) ⊓ a2(γ2)〉
• implication: A(γ1 → γ2) = 〈a1(γ1) ⊓ a1(γ2),a1(γ1) ⊓ a2(γ2)〉
The main feature of AR4 comes from the bilateral deﬁnition of strong
implication: its (antirealist) truth-conditions are strengthened and cor-
respond to those of conjunction, whilst the falsity-conditions remain the
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same as those for material implication. This stronger conditional has
been studied elsewhere [10], and fulﬁlls the two main inference rules for
implication: namely, modus ponens and modus tollens.
4.5. Consistency
A last and central critical remark to AR4 is the following: even if one
tolerates a perspectival or agent-centered deﬁnition of truth-values (cf.
Deﬁnition 3), there still remains a blatant confusion here above between
information and evidence. The latter is more speciﬁc than the former, in
the sense that evidence should aﬀord a good reason for agents to make
a distinction between data they accept and data they reject. Such a
distinction is not made a priori in our framework: despite a mainstream
view of justiﬁcation as giving either a suﬃcient or a conclusive evidence
for any given sentence, we explore the variability of this criterion of
suﬃciency to argue for an extension of the range of burdens of proof. In
this respect, the following wants to show that a diﬀerence is to be made
between several degrees of strength in truth-ascriptions. This leads to
an additional distinction between two logical norms of discourse: consis-
tency and coherence.
Definition 6. [Consistency] A language L is consistent iﬀ for any model
M interpreting and any sentence γ true in L: a1(γ) = 1 iﬀ a2(γ) = 0.
Definition 7. [Coherence] A language L is coherent iﬀ for any model
M interpreting and any sentence γ true in L: ai(γ) = 1 iﬀ ai(γ) 6= 0,
for i = 1, 2.
Coherence is stronger than consistency: every consistent language is
also coherent, whereas the converse need not hold. The language L of
AR4 is coherent and inconsistent.
4.6. A logic of justification AR4
The system AR4 is a formalization of what agents may accept or reject,
according to epistemic norms of truth-preservation. This norm is taken
to be a secondary burden of proof, assuming that epistemic agents all
agree about the conditions of truth-preservation but may disagree about
the justiﬁcation leading to truth.
Definition 8. [Justiﬁcation] A sentence γ is (anti-realistically) justiﬁed
iﬀ the agent is entitled to believe γ.
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It is worthwhile to note that the criteria of entitlement are located
at the epistemic level of norms, contrary to what is commonly assumed
in formal epistemology. This agent-centered approach to justiﬁcation
also departs from the classical evidence-based approach to hypotheses in
HLP. According to a strongly antirealist epistemology, it is not only the
amount of evidence of an event that justiﬁes its corresponding sentence;
rather, the choice is made by agents according to their admitted set
of norms of acceptance ruling the relation between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’
claims. Hence, this type of strongly antirealist justiﬁcation seems ade-
quate when it concerns decisions not requiring to be merely based on an
objective view on evidence, but on diﬀerent standards of acceptability
of evidence. These two views serve diﬀerent purposes. Let us see now
what these epistemic norms consist in.
Each of the epistemic attitudes is represented by a unary operator
in AR4. Given that the latter is a four-valued system, there is a total
amount of 256 such operators, including these attitudes.
Some of these operators may be used in order to characterize the
diﬀerent ways of dealing with evidence and we analyse a selection of
them based on their relevancy in dealing with evidence. Of course, to-
wards almost all the selected epistemic attitudes there is a very robust
philosophical discussion. Our operators have the limited purpose of ex-
plicating the formal properties of some epistemic attitudes in order to
clarify their diﬀerent burdens of proof.
A basic epistemic attitude is that of rationality, which ought to be
followed by any proper epistemic agent. Thus, for any sentence γ to be
interpreted epistemically as A(γ) = 〈a1(γ),a2(γ)〉 about what
the agent believes and disbelieves, respectively. The symbol ‘’ has to
be read as an unspeciﬁed operator for epistemic attitudes.
Definition 9. [Rationality] Epistemic agents are rational iﬀ they trust
the minimal amount of evidence at hand, whether for or against the
corresponding sentence γ.
• ai(γ) 6= 1, whenever ai(γ) = 1 and aj(γ) = 0, for i, j = 1, 2, where
i 6= j.
Such a broad deﬁnition of rationality helps to encompass a large
range of epistemic agents who do not share the same criteria of justiﬁ-
cation. It may seem queer at ﬁrst sight, by including an inequality sign.
A more intuitive account of rationality would be that an agent believes
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a sentence rationally whenever there is an argument for it, simpliciter.
But this excludes the next characterization of some rational agents, i.e.,
positivists (Deﬁnition 15). A more stringent clause would claim that
a rational agent believes a sentence whenever there is an argument for
it and no evidence against it. But that also excludes one category of
rational agents, viz. eclecticists (Deﬁnition 18). A more tolerant ver-
sion is that rational agents believe a sentence iﬀ there is no evidence
against it, simpliciter. But that rules out the categories of negativists
(Deﬁnition 16) and skeptics (Deﬁnition 17).
By contrast, irrationality resorts to agents who do not base their
attitude upon the evidence at hand. An analogy can also be made with
some unary operators of two-valued logic.
The two extreme operators of tautology and antilogy are operators
whose values are the same everywhere: only truth for tautology, only
falsehood for antilogy. Similarly, let us deﬁne the two irrational attitudes
of relativism and nihilism.
Definition 10. [Relativism ] Epistemic agents are relativists iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ, if there is evidence for γ or there is no evidence
for γ;
2. they disbelieve thatγ (i.e., believe that¬γ), if there is evidence against
γ or there is no evidence against γ.
Definition 11. [Nihilism ] Epistemic agents are nihilists iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ if there is evidence for γ and there is no evidence
for γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ if there is evidence against γ and there is no
evidence against γ.
Let us consider now the following epistemic attitudes: credulity and
incredulity.
Definition 12. [Credulity ] Epistemic agents are credulous iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ iﬀ there is evidence for γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ iﬀ there is evidence against γ.
Definition 13. [Incredulity ] Epistemic agents are incredulous iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ iﬀ there is no evidence for γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ iﬀ there is no evidence against γ.
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Credulous agents are rational agents who always trust the evidence
at hand, even inconsistently, while incredulous agents are irrational since
they always argue against the evidence at hand. Whether rational or ir-
rational, all these agents can be said to be intelligible for their behaviour
is always predictable. This is clariﬁed by the following deﬁnition:
Definition 14. [Intelligibility] Epistemic agents are intelligible iﬀ their
attitude is determined according to the evidence at hand.
• ai(γ) = f(ai(γ)), for i = 1, 2, where f is any function on ai(γ).
We can compare epistemic attitudes by means of their characteristic
matrices, whilst rationality and intelligibility are general attitudes em-
bracing a set of more speciﬁc attitudes and therefore do not have any
speciﬁc characteristic matrix:
γ γ γ γ γ
11 11 00 11 00
10 11 00 10 01
01 11 00 01 10
00 11 00 00 11
Other more relevant attitudes are to be listed, corresponding to more
rational behaviours of epistemic agents.
Hereafter, we propose at least four such attitudes: positivism, neg-
ativism, skepticism, and eclecticism. To make sense of the ﬁrst two
attitudes, an analogy with religious beliefs can be made.
On the one hand, believers and atheists embed two opposed attitudes
of positivism and negativism: the former favours any evidence for the
existence of God, whereas the latter favours any evidence against God.
In other words, both favour one sort of evidence against the other one.
Definition 15. [Positivism ] Epistemic agents are positivists iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ iﬀ there is evidence for γ or no evidence against γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ iﬀ there is no evidence for γ and evidence
against γ.
Definition 16. [Negativism ⊟] Epistemic agents are negativists iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ iﬀ there is evidence for γ and no evidence against γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ iﬀ there is no evidence for γ or evidence
against γ.
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On the other hand, skeptics and eclecticists are those agents who
do not want to favour positive or negative evidence and take any sort
of evidence into account, yet in a divergent way: the skeptic requires
complete evidence to believe a sentence, whereas the eclectisist has a
weaker criterion for the justiﬁcation of beliefs.
Definition 17. [Skepticism ⊠] Epistemic agents are skeptics iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ iﬀ there is evidence for γ and no evidence against γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ iﬀ there is no evidence for γ and evidence
against γ.
Definition 18. [Eclecticism ⊞] Epistemic agents are eclecticists iﬀ:
1. they believe that γ iﬀ there is evidence for γ or no evidence against γ;
2. they disbelieve that γ iﬀ there is no evidence for γ or evidence
against γ.
Here are the characteristic matrices of the last four rational epistemic
attitudes in AR4.
γ γ ⊟γ ⊠γ ⊞γ
11 10 01 00 11
10 10 10 10 10
01 01 01 01 01
00 10 01 00 11
These clearly show that both positivists and negativists have a con-
sistent behaviour: they always opt for a sentence or its negation, so that
the lack of evidence for or against a sentence is taken as evidence against
or for it. Then a varying list of theorems may correspond to each of the
single epistemic operators. Due to their signiﬁcance, the aforementioned
four operators of positivism, negativism, skepticism and eclecticism have
been studied elsewhere. For example, it has been argued in [11] that the
asymmetric diﬀerence between positivists and negativists echoes with
the diﬀerence between prosecution and defense in legal epistemology.
5. AR4 and LP
In this section we will compare the pragmatic approach to epistemic
attitudes with the one presented in AR4. So, what is the added value
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of AR4, with respect to LP? LP matches with the modal interpretations
of assertion and hypothesis, also paralleling the box and the diamond in
modal logic, respectively. AR4 proposes a more ﬁne-grained taxonomy
of epistemic agents, thanks to its many-valued characterization of truth
and falsity conditions. Is there any possible translation of one of these
systems into the other? This hardly seems possible, following the neg-
ative theorem given by Dugundji [8], according to which none of the
modal systems S1–S5 can be characterized by a many-valued ﬁnite ma-
trix. Furthermore, the occurrence of strong implication5 in AR4 should
entail some sensible diﬀerences in any theorem including this logical
constant in AR4. Nonetheless, we will show that some methods for
making sense of pragmatic formulas in a question-answer semantics are
still possible.
The following wants to betray a crucial semantic diﬀerence between
the modal and many-valued treatments of epistemic attitudes. That
is, it is possible to interpret HLP as a system in which there is still a
quantitative perspective regarding the content of hypotheses due to the
fuzzy interpretation of radical formulas, whereas a qualitative perspective
on justiﬁcation is associated with the question-answer semantics. Let us
see how such a discrepancy can be investigated by a logical perspective
(Section 5.1), before proposing another way to ﬁll (at least partially)
the gap between modal and many-valued readings of epistemic attitudes
(Section 5.2).
5.1. From LP to AR
Let τ be a translation function from LP to AR4. Then, it may be used
for a comparative analysis of the two modal and many-valued systems.
The task consists in translating the logics of assertions and hypotheses
into the logic of epistemic agents. We have:6
τ(⊢ γ) γ
τ(∼ δ) ¬(τ(δ))
τ(δ1 ∩ δ2) (τ(δ1))∧(τ(δ2))
τ(δ1 ∪ δ2) (τ(δ1))∨((τ(δ2))
5 For a study of implication in AR4, see [10, 11].
6 Notice, however, that the translation of (δ1⊃δ2) is (τ(δ1)→ τ(δ2)) and then,
by factivity of the operator describing assertion, we get τ(δ1)→ τ(δ2). Moreover, it
is easy to understand that  cannot be instantiated here with the same epistemic
attitude for assertions and hypotheses.
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τ(δ1 ⊃ δ2) (τ(δ1))→ (τ(δ2))
τ(δ1 ≡ δ2) (τ(δ1))↔ (τ(δ2))
τ(Hγ) γ
τ(⌢ κ) ¬(τ(κ))
τ(κ1 ∩ κ2) (τ(κ1))∧(τ(κ2))
τ(κ1 ∪ κ2) (τ(κ1))∨(τ(κ2))
τ(κ1 = κ2) (τ(κ1))→ (τ(κ2))
τ(κ1 ≡ κ2) (τ(κ1))↔ (τ(κ2))
If so, then which of the epistemic operators of AR4 has a behaviour
at closest with the acts of assertion and hypothesis? Skeptic agents, on
the one hand, are those whose behaviour mostly approximates those of
assertive agents in LP7, which have the highest epistemic standards; on
the other hand, eclecticists have the weakest behaviour by accepting the
greatest number of possibilities and this approximates the behaviour of
hypotheses in HLP.
5.2. Fuzzy questions
Another way to deal with pragmatic hypotheses in question-answer se-
mantics is the following. Instead of the two qualitative questions in AR4,
i.e., as to whether the sentence γ is (anti-realistically) true or false, it
is possible to provide a semantics based on a set of four quantitative
questions about the fuzzy value | · | of the content of a hypothesis γ in
[0, 1]. Let us consider the following set of questions:
q1(γ): |γ| = 1?
q2(γ): 0.5 < |γ| < 1?
q3(γ): 0 < |γ| ≤ 0.5?
q4(γ): |γ| = 0?
The upshot of such a new questioning is a system including 16 single
logical values; we call it AR16. Thanks to this fuzzy-based questioning, a
more detailed translation of a fragment of LP can be found by means of a
translation function τ∗ from the following formulas of LP to AR16. As we
will show, this fragment is particularly useful for analyzing the opposition
relations of some pragmatic formulas (interpreted in a question-answer
semantics).
7 For an antirealist version of LP and for an analysis of other illocutionary acts,
see [1, 2, 3].
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Figure 1. Czeżowski-like hexagon of opposition
τ ∗ ((⊢ γ) = J) A(γ) = 1000
τ ∗ ((⊢ γ) = U) A(γ) = 0111
τ ∗ ((⊢ ¬γ) = J) A(γ) = 0001
τ ∗ ((⊢ ¬γ) = U) A(γ) = 1110
τ ∗ ((Hγ) = J) A(γ) = 1110
τ ∗ ((Hγ) = U) A(γ) = 0001
τ ∗ ((H¬γ) = J) A(γ) = 0111
τ ∗ ((H¬γ) = U) A(γ) = 1000
τ ∗ ((⌢ Hγ) = J) A(γ) = 0011
τ ∗ ((⌢ Hγ) = U) A(γ) = 1100
Note that there is no substantial diﬀerence between AR4 and AR16,
with respect to their deﬁnitions of logical constants. However, in AR16
is thus possible to give a semantics based on quantitative questions. In
this way it is also possible to interpret some basic opposition relations,
which are particularly relevant in LP given its variety of negations. This
task is easily accomplished by considering the Czeżowski-like hexagon of
opposition (see Figure 1) relating pragmatic formulas and the question-
answer semantics proposed in AR16.
An algebraic proof of the above logical relations can be given in
Boolean terms, following some previous results (see [9, 14]). In a nut-
shell, logical opposition are to be deﬁned by set-theoretical operations of
meet and join on bitstrings. It results in the second hexagon of logical
opposition (see Figure 2), where the valuations are semantic interpreta-
tions of the corresponding pragmatic formulas.
528 Daniele Chiffi and Fabien Schang
Figure 2. Hexagon of logical opposition
6. Conclusion
The acceptance of hypotheses requires certain epistemic norms that
agents are supposed to follow in order to make sound epistemic decisions.
Epistemic normativity can be modelled following: (i) a classical view on
truth and justiﬁcation, in which the concept of truth is a semantic no-
tion independent of the epistemic conditions of justiﬁcation, or (ii) an
antirealist view in which the notion of truth is epistemically constrained.
Thus, according to (i) there may exist transcendent truth, whereas this
is not possible for (ii). First, we have presented a pragmatic logical
framework for hypotheses and assertions based on a realistic epistemo-
logical ground. Another speciﬁc feature of these pragmatic systems is the
presence of a variety of negations. Then, we have introduced the systems
AR4 and AR4, which are grounded on an antirealist epistemology. An
extended version of AR4, called AR16, has been brieﬂy outlined in order
to give a question-answer interpretation of the role of negations in LP,
which are relevant for understanding pragmatic opposition relations. We
have pointed out that in LP it is possible to express clear distinctions
between semantic and justiﬁcation conditions, even though not many
forms of proof burdens can be formalized. On the other hand, AR4 and
AR4 may express many burdens of proof regarding the acceptance of
hypotheses for agents accepting diﬀerent norms of epistemic rationality.
Finally, we have provided some (partial) translations among the logical
systems considered in order to analyze (from a compatibilist perspec-
tive) the dialectics between realists and antirealists in logic and logical
philosophy.
The logical burdens of proof 529
Acknowledgements. The research of Daniele Chiﬃ is supported by the
Estonian Research Council, Research Grant, Abduction in the age of
fundamental uncertainty (PUT 1305; PI Pietarinen). The research of Fa-
bien Schang has been granted initially as an output of a research project
implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National
Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE), Moscow. The
main ideas of the paper have been presented at the meeting of the Nordic
Network for the Philosophy of Science (NNPS2016) in Pärnu, Estonia.
We thank Amirouche Mokteﬁ, Paweł Pruski, and the two anonymous
referees for helpful comments on this paper.
References
[1] Bellin, G., “Assertions, hypotheses, conjectures, expectations: Rough-
sets semantics and proof-theory”, pages 193–241 in Advances in Nat-
ural Deduction: A Celebration of Dag Prawitz’s Work, L. C. Pereira,
E. H. Haeusler, V. de Paiva (eds.), “Trends in Logic”, vol. 39, Springer,
Dordrecht, 2014. DOI: 10.1007/978-94-007-7548-0_10
[2] Bellin, G., M. Carrara, D. Chiﬃ, D., and A. Menti, “Pragmatic and dia-
logic interpretations of bi-intuitionism. Part I”, Logic and Logical Philos-
ophy 23, 4 (2014): 449–480. DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2014.011
[3] Bellin, G., M. Carrara, and D. Chiﬃ, “On an intuitionistic logic for prag-
matics”, Journal of Logic and Computation, exv036 (2015). DOI: 10.
1093/logcom/exv036
[4] Carrara, M., D. Chiﬃ, and C. De Florio, “Assertions and hypotheses:
A logical framework for their opposition relations”, Logic Journal of the
IGPL 25, 2 (2017): 131–144. DOI: 10.1093/jigpal/jzw036
[5] Carrara, M., and D. Chiﬃ, “The knowability paradox in the light of a
logic for pragmatics”, pages 47–58 in Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic,
R. Ciuni, H. Wansing, and C. Willkommen (eds.), “Proceedings of Trends
in Logic XI”, Studia Logica Library, “Trends in Logic”, vol. 41, Springer,
Berlin, 2014. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-06080-4_3
[6] Carrara, M., D. Chiﬃ, and D. Sergio, “Knowledge and proof: a mul-
timodal pragmatic language”, pages 1–13 in Logica Yearbook 2013,
V. Punčochář and M. Dančák (eds.), College Publication, London, 2014.
[7] Dalla Pozza, C., and C. Garola, “A pragmatic interpretation of intuition-
istic propositional logic”, Erkenntnis 43 (1995): 81–109. DOI: 10.1007/
BF01131841
[8] Dugundji, J., “Note on a property of matrices for Lewis and Langford’s
calculi of propositions”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic 5, 4 (1940): 150–
151. DOI: 10.2307/2268175
530 Daniele Chiffi and Fabien Schang
[9] Schang, F., “Abstract logic of oppositions”, Logic and Logical Philosophy
21 (2012): 415–438. DOI: 10.12775/LLP.2012.019
[10] Schang, F., “A four-valued strong implication”, 2017 (unpublished
manuscript).
[11] Schang, F., and A. Costa-Leite, “Une sémantique générale des croyances
justiﬁées”, CLE 16, 3 (2016).
[12] Shramko, Y. “Dual intuitionistic logic and a variety of negations: the logic
of scientiﬁc research”, Studia Logica 80, 2–3 (2005): 347–367. DOI: 10.
1007/s11225-005-8474-7
[13] Shramko, Y., “A modal translation for dual-intuitionistic logic”, The
Review of Symbolic Logic 9, 2 (2016): 251–265. DOI: 10.1017/
S1755020316000022
[14] Smessaert, H., “On the 3D visualization of the logical relations”, Logica
Universalis 3 (2009): 212–231. DOI: 10.1007/s11787-009-0010-5
Daniele Chiffi
Tallinn University of Technology
Ragnar Nurkse Department of Innovation and Governance
Akadeemia tee 3
12618 Tallinn, Estonia
chiffidaniele@gmail.com
Fabien Schang
Universidade Estadual de Maringá
Centro de Cięncias Humanas
Letras e Artes
Avenida Colombo
Campus Universitário – CEP 87.020-900 – Maringá – PR, Brazil
schangfabien@gmail.com
